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Farr: United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative: The Medica

UNITED STA TES V. OAKLAND CANNABIS BUYERS'
COOPERATIVE: THE MEDICAL NECESSITY
DEFENSE AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Can you imagine how it would feel to be diagnosed with glaucoma and to
discover that the disease would render you blind? Can you imagine what you
would do if no prescription drugs were available to slow down the disease, but
there was an illegal drug that could delay or possibly prevent the blindness?
Would you comply with the law and face certain blindness, or would you break
the law and give yourself a chance to see longer? What if you were suffering
from severe nausea and lack of appetite due to cancer or AIDS treatment?
Would you not try almost anything to alleviate the pain and to prolong your
life?
Many patients struggle with these exact choices when they confront the
federal law that forbids medicinal uses ofmarijuana. They are forced to choose
between either breaking the law and facing serious consequences or complying
with the law and enduring painful suffering that could have been avoided.
In November 1996, California attempted to resolve this dilemma by voting
on an initiative entitled Proposition 215.' This initiative created an exception
to the California laws that prohibit the use and cultivation of marijuana.2
Proposition 215 was designed to allow seriously ill patients to possess
marijuana and to permit theirprimary caregivers to possess and grow marijuana
for them.3 The initiative passed and became the Compassionate Use Act of
1996 (Use Act).4 The Use Act's purpose is to allow seriously ill patients to
obtain marijuanawhen aphysician recommends itbecause the "person's health
would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia,
AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other
illness for which marijuana provides relief."5 The Use Act also ensures that
patients and physicians are not subject to state criminal prosecution or sanction
for the possession, manufacture, or distribution of marijuana.6 It aspires to
"encourage the federal and state governments to implement a plan to provide

1. Brief for the Respondents at 1, United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 121
S. Ct. 1711 (2001) (No. 00-151).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2001).
5. Id. § (b)C)(A).
6. Id. § (b)(1)(B).
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for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical
need of marijuana. 7
In response to the Use Act's passage, several groups organized nonprofit
medical cannabis dispensaries to safely and inexpensively distribute marijuana
to patients in need.8 The Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative (Cooperative)
is one such dispensary.9 Before patients are allowed to become members, the
Cooperative requires them to provide a written recommendation from their
physician stating that the patient would benefit from the medicinal use of
marijuana. After a screening interview by the Cooperative's staff and
verification of the physician's approval, patients approved for membership
receive an identification card."
Despite this apparently reasonable solution, the federal government
challenged the Use Act as a violation of the Federal Controlled Substances Act
of 1970 (CSA), 2 which prohibits the distribution, manufacture, dispensation
and possession of marijuana. 3 The federal government sued the Cooperative
and similar dispensaries to enjoin them from distributing and manufacturing
marijuana.14 In opposing the injunction, the Cooperative asserted a medical
necessity defense.'" This common law defense, a "choice-of-evils" defense,
allows a person to choose illegal conduct when it is the lesser of two evils. 6
The necessity defense allows a person to violate the law and produce some
harm rather than to follow the law and cause a greater amount of harm.' 7
Notwithstanding the availability of this defense, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California granted the government a
preliminary injunction. 8 The court found the necessity defense was insufficient
to block the injunction because the individual dispensaries could not satisfy the
defense's requirements. 19 To properly assert the necessity defense, the
dispensaries had to satisfy its elements for each and every member and not just
for the group as a whole. 20

7. Id. § (b)(1)(C).
8. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 121 S. Ct. 1711, 1715 (2001);
United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091-92 (N.D. Cal 1998).
9. Respondent's Brief at 1,United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 121 S. Ct.
1711 (No. 00-151).
10. Id. at 2.
11. Id.
12. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 121 S. Ct. at 1715-16.
13. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (West 1999).
14. United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1092-93 (N.D. Cal.
1998).
15. See Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1101.
16. See WAYNE R. LAFAv & AUSTIN W. SCoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.4 (2d ed. 1986);
21 AM. JUR. 2D CriminalLaw § 158 (1998).
17. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 16, § 5.4, at 442.
18. See Cannabis CultivatorsClub, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1106.
19. Id. at 1102.
20. Id. For a detailed discussion of these elements, see infra Part ll.A.
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However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
order and remanded the case.2 ' The Ninth Circuit held that the necessity
defense was a "legally cognizable defense that likely would pertain in the
circumstances" and found no evidence that Congress had limited the court's
"broad equitable discretion" to issue injunctions under the CSA.2 According
to the Ninth Circuit, when formulating the proper injunction, the district court
had to "expressly consider the public interest on the record;" one such interest
that the district court failed to consider was the "availability of a doctorprescribed treatment that would help ameliorate the condition and relieve the
pain and suffering of a large group of persons with serious or fatal illnesses."'
The Ninth Circuit also held that the evidence on the record was sufficient to
support the Cooperative's motion to modify and narrow the injunction.2'
The federal government appealed the Ninth Circuit's decision to the U. S.
Supreme Court, andthe Supreme Court reversed.' The Court observed that the
necessity defense "[could not] succeed when the legislature itselfha[d already]
made a 'determination of values."' 26 According to the majority, such a
determination had been made because the CSA stated that Schedule I
controlled substances, includingmarijuana, had "no currently accepted medical
use. 2 7 Because of this language, the Court concluded that marijuana had "no
medical benefits worthy of an exception."'
The Court's rejection of the medical necessity defense as an implied
exception to the CSA demonstrates the Court's failure to consider its past
acceptance of the necessity defense and its failure to analyze the CSA as a
whole. First, the opinion begins by expressing doubt as to whether "federal
courts ever have authority to recognize a necessity defense not provided by
statute"' despite the fact that many federal courts, including the Supreme
Court, have considered the defense. 0 Second, the history of marijuana
legislation and marijuana's medical uses suggest that the "determination of
values" in the CSA is not as simple as the Court conveys. 31 Furthermore, the
Act does not contain the appropriate, clear language necessary to abrogate a
common law defense.3 2 Finally, although the Court was correct in finding that

21. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 190 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir.
1999).
22. Id. at 1114.
23. Id.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 1115.
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 121 S.Ct. 1711, 1722 (2001).
Id. at 1718 (citation omitted).
Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)-(c) (Supp. 2001).
Oakland CannabisBuyers'Coop., 121 S. Ct. at 1718.
Id. at 1717.
See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 16, § 5.4, at 441-43.
See infra Part Ill.
See infra Part IV.
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the dispensaries could not satisfy the elements ofthe medical necessity defense,
it incorrectly denied individuals the opportunity to argue the defense.33
This Comment examines the necessity defense and its applicability to the
CSA in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Oakland
CannabisBuyers' Cooperative.34 Part II describes the elements and purpose of
the necessity defense and critiques the Court's analysis of the defense. Part 1H
details marijuana's medicinal values and reviews the history of federal law
regulating marijuana use. Part IV argues that there is no "determination of
values" in the CSA. Finally, Part V analyzes the use of the medical necessity
defense in marijuana cases and asserts an individual's right to use the defense.
II. THE VIABILITY OF THE NECESSITY DEFENSE
A.

The Elements, Purpose,and Limitations of the Necessity Defense

The necessity defense applies to situations in which one is forced to choose
between two alternatives, both of which will result in some harm.35 This
"choice-of-evils" defense allows an individual to choose illegal conduct when
it is the lesser of two evils. 36 It addresses the dilemma that arises when one can
choose to produce some harm by violating the law or can choose to cause
greater harm by following the law. 37 However, the defense cannot be used if
there exists any "reasonable, legal alternative" to the illegal conduct which
would avoid the threatened harm.38
Public policy requires that the defense be available because the "law ought
to promote the achievement of higher values at the expense of lesser values,
and sometimes the greater good for society will be accomplished by violating
the literal language of the criminal law."39 "Necessity is, essentially, a
utilitarian defense" which "maximiz[es] social welfare by allowing a crime to
be committed where the social benefits of the crime outweigh the social costs
of failing to commit the crime. ' 4 The defense can be viewed as "allow[ing the
people] to act as individual legislatures, amending a particular criminal
provision or crafting a one-time exception to it, subject to court review, when
a real legislature would formally do the same under those circumstances."'"

The necessity defense prevents a boat captain from being found guilty of
trespass when he chooses to dock his boat at a private port during a storm in

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See infra Part V.
121 S.Ct. 1711 (2001).
LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 16, § 5.4, at 441-42.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,410 (1980).
LAFAVE & ScorT, supra note 16, § 5.4, at 442.
United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 196-97; see also 21 AM. JUR. 2D CriminalLaw § 158 (1998) (same).
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order to save his passengers' lives. 2 Likewise, the defense allows an
ambulance to speed in order to get to the hospital more quickly without being
prosecuted for the traffic violation It also allows a prisoner to avoid guilt for
a prison escape if the prison is on fire through no fault of his own."
To use the necessity defense, a defendant must establish four elements:
(1) [T]hat he was faced with a choice of evils and chose the
lesser evil; (2) that he acted to prevent imminent harm; (3)
that he reasonably anticipated a causal relation between his
conduct and the harm to be avoided; and (4) that there were
no other legal alternatives to violating the law.4"
This analysis requires consideration of the harm avoided, the harm done, and
the defendant's intent to avoid the greater harm.' The harm avoided may be
bodily harm or harm to property.' The harm done may be almost anything
from property damage to intentional homicide, and it is the "harm-reasonablyexpected, rather than the hann-actually-caused, which governs." 4 The second
and third elements of the defense require that the person intentionally sought
to avoid a greater harm when he made his choice.49 The individual cannot have
intended to break the law for another purpose and then accidentally avoid
0
greater harm."

42. See The William Gray, 29 F. Cas. 1300, 1302 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1810) (No. 17,694).
43. See State v. Gorham, 188 P. 457,457-58 (Wash. 1920).
44. See People v. Whipple, 279 P. 1008, 1010 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929).
45. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 693 (9th Cir. 1989). For another formulation
of the requisite elements seeJenksv. State, 582 So. 2d 676, 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). Jenks
requires the defendant to establish the following:
1. That [he] did not intentionally bring about the circumstance which
precipitated the unlawful act; 2. That [he] could not accomplish the same
objective using a less offensive alternative available to [him]; and 3. That
the evil sought to be avoided was more heinous than the unlawful act
perpetrated to avoid it.
Id. For still a third test, see State v. Cram, 600 A.2d 733, 735 (Vt. 1991). Cram requires that:
(1) [Tlhere ...
be a situation of emergency arising without fault on the part
of the actor concerned;
(2) this emergency ... be so imminent and compelling as to raise a
reasonable expectation of harm, either directly to the actor or upon those
he was protecting;
(3) this emergency... present no reasonable opportunity to avoid the
injury without doing the criminal act; and
(4) the injury impending from the emergency . . .be of sufficient
seriousness to outmeasure the criminal wrong.
Id. (quoting State v. Warshow, 410 A.2d 1000, 1001-02 (Vt. 1979)).
46. LAFAVE & Scorr, supranote 16, § 5.4, at 445-46.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 446.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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The first element of the defense is extremely crucial. It requires a person
to balance the harms and convince a court that the harm avoided exceeds the
harm done."' The defense applies only if a court finds that the "harm that would
have resulted from compliance with the law significantly outweighs the harm
that reasonably could result from the court's acceptance of necessity as an
excuse in the circumstances presented by the particular case."'
The other elements of the defense are similarly important. A court must
decide, as a matter of law, whether or not the defendant's facts, if taken to be
true, are sufficient to satisfy each element.5 3 If the facts do satisfy each element,
then the defendant is entitled to have the defense submitted to the jury for
consideration. 4
The necessity defense is not available if the legislature has already made
a "determination ofvalues" 5 ---the legislature cannot have already resolved the
balancing of harms and determined that complying with the law is the lesser
harm. 6 If a "deliberate legislative choice as to the values at issue" has
been
5
made, then "the availability of the defense of necessity is precluded. 1
B. The U.S. Supreme Court'sOpinion Regardingthe NecessityDefense
With its opinion in Oakland Cannabis, the U.S. Supreme Court has
choosen to ignore the established common law principles of the necessity
defense. Instead, the Court casts doubt on the defense, calls it "somewhat
controversial," and claims that it has never been completely recognized as a
viable defense by federal courts. 8 This assertion quite simply contradicts case
law. Necessity has long been accepted as a defense to criminal prosecution. 9
The concurring opinion, authored by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg,
recognizes the majority's mistake and remarks that the Court's "precedent has
expressed no doubt about the viability of the common-law defense, even in the

51. Id. at 446-47.
52. Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 575 N.E.2d 741, 744 (Mass. 1991).
53. State v. Cram, 600 A.2d 733, 734 (Vt. 1991).

54. Id.
55. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 16, § 5.4, at 442.
56. 21 AM. JuR. 2D CriminalLaw §.158 (1998).
57. Cram, 600 A.2d at 735 (quoting State v. Warshow, 410 A.2d 1000, 1003 (Vt. 1979));
see also Long v. Commonwealth, 478 S.E.2d 324, 327 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the
necessity defense was precluded when the licensure suspension statute regarding habitual
offenders addressed necessity in the context of the mitigation of punishment).
58. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 121 S.Ct. 1711, 1717 (2001).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,425 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)

(stating that the necessity defense has been accepted throughout the criminal justice system);
Jenks v.State, 582 So. 2d 676, 678 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1991) (concluding that the "defense was
recognized at common law and that there has been no clearly expressed legislative rejection of
such defense"); Long, 478 S.E.2d at 327 (analyzing necessity as a defense to a violation of a
habitual offender statute and ruling that the defense could notbe used because the statute already
addressed it in the context of the mitigation of punishment).
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context of federal criminal statutes that do not provide for it in so many
words. 60
The Supreme Court has only directly addressed the necessity defense in
one other case. In contrast to OaklandCannabis, UnitedStates v. Bailey6' did
not attack the defense. The defendants in Bailey were charged with violating
a statute that governed escape from federal custody. 62 Asserting the necessity
defense, they claimed the horrible conditions in the jail necessitated their
escape.63 The Court's opinion never questioned the validity of the defense, nor
did it rule that the statute precluded the defense. Though the Court held the
defendants could not use the defense, this holding was made because the Court
found that "where a criminal defendant [was] charged with escape... he [had
to] proffer evidence of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody"
before he could assert the necessity defense.r6
A 1884 Queen's Bench case is the only case the Oakland Cannabis
majority cites to support the idea that the necessity defense is controversial. 65
However, this case does not support such a claim because the Queen's Bench
actually considered the defense without reservation.66 The real issue in that case
was the use of the necessity defense in homicide cases.6' After reviewing the
opinions of several scholars, the court concluded that the necessity defense
could not be used in a homicide case, even if the homicide was necessary to
preserve one's own life. 68 Contraryto the Court's majority opinion, in Oakland
Cannabiscommon law has acknowledged the necessity defense since at least
1551.69

60. OaklandCannabisBuyers'Coop., 121 S.Ct. at 1723 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
61. 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
62. Id. at 396.
63. Id. at 398. The defendants claimed that the guards hadjoined other cellmates in setting
things on fire and that the guards would just allow the fires to bum out. Id. They also produced
evidence that the guards subjected them to beatings and threatened their lives. Id.
64. Id. at415.
65. Oakland CannabisBuyers' Coop., 121 S.Ct. at 1717 (citing Queen v. Dudley &
Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 277-78 (1884)).
66. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. at 276-77.
67. Id. at281.
68. Id. at 286-88.
69. Todd H. Whilton, Note, Commonwealth v. Hutchins: A DefendantIs Deniedthe Right
to Present a Medical Necessity Defense, 27 NENv ENG. L. Rlv. 1101, 1103 (1993) (footnote
omitted).
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III. THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT AND THE POSSIBLE MEDICAL USES
OF MARIJUANA

A.

The Benefits of MarijuanaUse

It is important for the necessity defense to be available because, for some
individuals, marijuana is the only drug that can effectively relieve their pain
and suffering. Marijuana helps with nausea and vomiting associated with
chemotherapy treatment; ameliorates intraocular pressure so that glaucoma
patients can avoid blindness for years; reduces epileptic episodes; alleviates
chronic pain; treats nausea, vomiting and loss of appetite for AIDS patients;
limits muscle pain and spasticity caused by multiple sclerosis; reduces pain and
tremors for paraplegics and quadriplegics; and even helps with depression and
other mood disorders.7" In many of these cases, legal drugs and treatments,
71
unlike the medicinal marijuana, do little to alleviate the symptoms.
Marijuana has not always been labeled as an illegal drug. It has been used
in the East for centuries for therapeutic reasons and came to the West as a
medicine in the mid-1800s. 72 The United States Dispensatory first listed

marijuana in 1854 and permitted commercially-prepared marijuana to be
obtained in drug stores. 7' Beginning in the 1850s,physicians published articles
and research studies arguing that marijuana had medicinal value due to its
ability to alleviate many of the symptoms listed above.74
Despite its current label as a Schedule I drug with no medicinal value,
research continues to reveal marijuana's medical benefits. In 1997, the White
House Office of National Drug Control Policy asked the Institute of Medicine
(Institute) to review scientific evidence regarding the "potential health benefits
and risks of marijuana. 7 S The study focused on cannabinoids, which comprise
all the compounds related to tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the primary active

70. See generally ED ROSENTHAL & STEVE KUBBY,WHY MARIJUANA SHOULD BE LEGAL
67-70 (1996) (listing various medical applications of marijuana); LESTER GRINSPOON, M.D. &
JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA, THE FoRBIDDENMEDICINE 24-133 (1993) (describing in detail
marijuana's myriad medicinal uses).
71. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 70, at 24-133. In chapter two, the authors
discuss in detail the benefits ofmarijuana for medical purposes and the problems of legal drugs.
Id. For example, certain drugs are legally prescribed to reduce the side effects of cancer

chemotherapy, but these extremely expensive drugs sometimes never work or work for a very
short time. Id. at 25-26. One study found that out of "fifty-six patients who got no relief from
[legal drugs], 78 percent became symptom-free when they smoked marihuana." Id. at 26. The
chapterproceeds to offer compelling, real-life accounts ofpeople who found marijuana effective
where legal drugs were not for cancer therapy, glaucoma, epilepsy, multiple sclerosis,
paraplegia, and quadripelegia, among others. Id. at 26-133.
72. Id. at 3-4.
73. Id. at 4.
74. Id. at 5-7.
75. MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE 1 (Janet E. Joy et al. eds.,
1999) [hereinafter MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE].
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ingredient in marijuana.76 The Institute concluded that these compounds played
a"natural role in pain modulation, control ofmovement, and memory" and that
the withdrawal symptoms "appear[ed] to be mild compared to opiates or
' Though the study found that
benzodiazepines, such as diazepam (Valium)."77
there often exist more effective drugs than THC compounds (including
marijuana), it noted that "people vary in their responses to medications, and
there will likely always be a subpopulation of patients who do not respond well
to other medications."7 In addition, the Institute concluded that "except for the
harms associated with smoking, the adverse effects of marijuana use are within
the range of effects tolerated for other medications. 79
The Institute's report describes marijuana as a potentially effective drug for
relief from pain, nausea, and for the stimulation of appetite."0 The study notes
that the therapeutic effects of cannabinoid drugs "are most well established for
THC."' According to the report, cannabinoid drugs could "offer broadspectrum relief not found in any other single medication" for patients who
suffer simultaneously from severe pain, nausea, and weight loss, particularly
for AIDS and cancer patients undergoing chemotherapy. 2 Though the
researchers found less support for cannabinoid drugs' therapeutic effects on
movement disorders, epilepsy, and glaucoma, they did not discount such effects
entirely; instead, the report labeled this application the "least promising."' 3
B. FederalLaws Prohibitingthe Medicinal Use ofMarijuana
Marijuana was not always prohibited and condemned as arecreational drug
with no medical value. One of the first federal laws to regulate the use of
marijuana was a 1937 tax law. 4 The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 (Tax Act)
imposed a transfer tax requiring anyone who manufactured, imported,
possessed, dispensed, or otherwise used marijuana to pay special taxes and to
register his name and place of business with the local tax collector. s Producers
of marijuana, physicians, dentists, and other practitioners who distributed,
dispensed, or otherwise used marijuana were required to pay a tax of one dollar
per year; the Tax Act made it unlawful to "import, manufacture, produce,

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 177.

81. MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE, supra note 75, at 177.

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Marihuana TaxAct of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551 (1937) (repealed

1970). See also Michael Aldrich, History of Therapeutic Cannabis,in CANNABIS IN MEDICAL
PRACTICE: A LEGAL, HISTORICAL AND PHARMACOLOGICAL OVERVIEW Op THERAPEUTIc USE OF
49-50 (Mary Lynn Mathre ed., 1997) (noting the repeal of the Marihuana Tax Act
of 1937).
85. Ch. 553, 50 Stat. at 551-52.
MARIJUANA
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compound, sell, deal in, distribute, dispense, prescribe, [or] administer"
marijuana if the tax was not paid.86 The purpose of the Tax Act was not to
abolish the medicinal use of marijuana, which was accepted at the time, but to
discourage the recreational use of the drug.87 Unfortunately, the law required
extensive paperwork when marijuana was sought to be used for medical
purposes, thus making it increasingly difficult to legally obtain the drug.8 Four
years later, marijuana was removed from the United States Pharmacopoeia and
National Formulary because federal restrictions made it increasingly
inconvenient for manufacturers to dispense the drug legally."'
The decline in medical marijuana use was also brought about by the
Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act (Narcotic Drugs Act) and the responses
to it.90 While the Tax Act was still in effect, Congress enacted the Narcotic
Drugs Act, which governed all illegal importation and smuggling of
marijuana. 9' The Narcotic Drugs Act forbid marijuana importation and the
buying, selling, or transporting of imported marijuana. 92 Furthermore, the Act
presumed that marijuana possessors were using illegally-imported marijuana,
stating that "such possession [will] be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize
conviction, unless the defendant explain[ed] the possession to the satisfaction
of the jury."'93 In addition, many states had statutes that made marijuana
possession illegal. 9
When combined with the Tax Act, these federal and state laws became a
problem. In order for marijuana users to comply with the Tax Act, they had to
report the possession of marijuana. 9 However, because state laws made
marijuana possession illegal and the Narcotic Drugs Act presumed that the drug
was illegally imported, reporting possession in accordance with the Tax Act
created a "per se violation of both federal and state marijuana laws. 96 In 1969,
the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged this problem inLearyv. UnitedStates.Y
The Court held that the Narcotic Drugs Act violated due process by presuming

86. Id. at 552-53.
87. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 70, at 8.
88. Id.
89. Id.; see also Aldrich, supranote 84, at49 (discussing marijuana's 1941 removal from
the United States Pharmacopeia).
90. Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, Pub. L. No. 84-728, ch. 629, 70 Stat. 570
(1956) (repealed 1970). For a discussion ofPresident Nixon's 1970 repeal of the various federal
drug laws, see Aldrich, supra note 84, at 49-50.
91. See Allison L. Bergstrom, Medical Use of Marijuana: A Look at Federal & State
Responses to California'sCompassionate Use Act, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 155, 159
(1997).
92. Id.

93.
94.
quantity
95.
96.
97.

Ch.629, 70 Stat. at 571.
See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 16 (1969) ("[un late 1965, possession of any
ofmarihuana was apparently a crime in every one of the 50 states.").
See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
Bergstrom, supra note 91, at 159.
395 U.S. 6 (1969).
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that a "defendant knew of the unlawful importation or bringing in [of the
drug]."93 It also held the Tax Act unconstitutional because complying with the
Act had the effect of self-incrimination under federal and state marijuana
laws. 99
By the time the Supreme Court found the Marijuana Tax Act and the
Narcotic Drugs Act unconstitutional, legislative concern about the recreational
use of marijuana had greatly increased.'00 In response to this concern and the
Leary decision, Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).' 0 '
Congress made several findings regarding controlled substances, including a
finding that "[t]he illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, andpossession
and improper use of controlled substances have a substantial and detrimental
effect on the health and general welfare of the American people."'0 2
In response to these findings, Congress grouped prescription drugs into a
series of "schedules" ranging from Schedule I, which prohibits any use of the
drug, to Schedule V, which imposes the least amount of restriction. 3
Marijuana is classified as a Schedule I drug, meaning that it has "a high
potential for abuse" and has "no currently accepted medical use in treatment;"
furthermore, Schedule I drugs are not "safe[] for use... [even] under medical
supervision.""' Schedule II drugs also have a "high potential for abuse" but
these drugs have "a currently accepted medical use in treatment ...

or a

currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions. ' 'OThe CSA gives the
U.S. Attorney General the power to reschedule controlled substances.'0 6 In
order to do so, the Attorney General must request a scientific and medical
evaluation from the Secretary of Health and Human Services along with the
Secretary's recommendations as to whether the drug should be rescheduled or
removed as a controlled substance.0 7 The Attorney General may use only these
findings to ultimately determine whether or not the drug warrants removal or
rescheduling.'0 s
In 1972, the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws
(NORML) petitioned the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), formerly the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, to reschedule marijuana as a
Schedule H drug or to remove it entirely from the list of controlled

98. Id. at 37.
99. Id. at 26.
100. GRINSPOON&BAKALARsupra note 70, at 13.

101. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-971 (West 1999); see also Bergstrom, supra note 91, at 160
(detailing the legislative response to the increasing recreational use of marijuana).
102. 21 U.S.C.A. § 801(2).
103. Id. § 812.
104. Id. § 812(b)(1).
105. Id. § 812(b)(2).
106. Id. § 811.
107. Id. § 811(b).
108. 21 U.S.C. § 811(b).
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substances.' 0 9 This effort began nearly two decades of litigation as NORML
and other groups such as the Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics, lobbied the
DEA to reevaluate marijuana's medical use."' In 1986, public hearings finally
began, and many witnesses, including doctors and patients, were called to
testify."' The hearings lasted for two years and concluded with the DEA's
Administrative Law Judge, Francis L. Young, recommending that marijuana
be rescheduled as a Schedule II substance."' Judge Young determined that
approval by a "significant minority" of physicians in the United States was
sufficient to find that marijuana had a current medical use so as to justify its
classification as a schedule II drug."' He ruled as follows:
The evidence in this record clearly shows that marijuana has
been accepted as capable of relieving the distress of great
numbers of very ill people, and doing so with safety under
medical supervision. It would be unreasonable, arbitrary and
capricious for DEA to continue to stand between those
4
sufferers and the benefits of this substance in this record."
Despite these strong recommendations, the DEA refused to reschedule
marijuana because it believed that a "significant minority" of physicians was
insufficient to prove marijuana had accepted medical uses." 5 In 1994, the U.S.
District Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in a petition for review
of the DEA's final order, ruled that marijuana possessed no medicinal value." 6
IV. CONGRESS HAS NOT MADE A "DETERMINATION OF VALUES" IN THE
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT

The U.S. Supreme Court found that Congress had made a "determination
of values" in the CSA since the Act describes Schedule I drugs as having no
currently accepted medical use, therefore, the necessity defense could not even
be raised.' However, courts should not construe statutes to exclude common
law defenses unless there exists an absolutely clear legislative intention to do

109. See Aldrich, supra note 84, at 51; ALAN BOCK, WAITING TO INHALE: THE POLInTCS OF
MEDICAL MARIJUANA 224 (2000); GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 70, at 13; Andrew J.
LeVay, Note, Urgent Compassion: Medical Marijuana, ProsecutorialDiscretion and the

MedicalNecessityDefense,41 B.C.L.REv. 699, 704 (2000); Marcia Tiersky, Comment,Medical
Marijuana: Puttingthe Power Where it Belongs, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 547, 550 (1999).
110. Aldrich, supra note 84, at 51.
111. GRiNsPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 70, at 14-15.
112. LeVay, supra note 109, at 704.

113. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 70, at 15; see 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(2)(B).
114. Aldrich, supra note 84, at 51-52.
115. GRiNSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 70, at 16-17.

116. Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 15 F.3d 1131, 1137
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
117. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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so."' In particular, criminal statutes "'are not to be construed as taking away
a common law right, unless the intention is manifest;' therefore, if the
legislature does not expressly deny the right to raise a necessity defense, then
the defense should be available. ' 9
The CSA does not manifest a clear legislative intention to exclude the
necessity defense. In order for a statute to make such intent "manifest," it
would need to clearly weigh the harms addressed by the defense. For example,
an abortion statute that makes abortion illegal even though childbirth places a
woman's life in danger demonstrates that the legislature has weighed the
competing harms and has decided that having an abortion would cause greater
harm than enforcing the law. It could also be assumed that the necessity
defense would be precluded if pleas ofnecessity were already provided by the
20
legislature in other sections of the CSA, such as in the mitigation section.
The Supreme Court did not hold the necessity defense inapplicable in United
States v. Bailey, 2' where a federal statute designed to punish escapees from
federal custody was as clear as the CSA in its purpose."n Like the CSA, the
federal statute at issue in Bailey did not contain clear language negating the
necessity defense.Iu As an implicit acknowledgment of this fact,4the Court did
not deprive the parties of the opportunity to argue the defense.1
The CSA simply classifies drugs into certain schedules, preventing the use
of Schedule I drugs because they have "no currently accepted medical use."'"
The CSA does not explicitly deny such drugs to patients who have an absolute
need for the drugs in order to alleviate severe ailments and diseases. Most
significantly, Congress does not say that Schedule I drugs have absolutely no
medical use. It specifically states that these drugs have "no currently accepted

118. Jenks v. State, 582 So. 2d 676, 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
119.
120.
121.
122.

Whilton, supranote 69, at 1130 (quoting Melody v. Reab, 4 Mass. 471,473 (1808)).
See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
444 U.S. 394 (1980).
Id. at 410-11. 18 U.S.C.A. § 751(a) (West 2000) provides:
Whoever escapes or attempts to escape from the custody of the Attorney

General or his authorized representative, or from any institution or facility
in which he is confined by direction of the Attorney General, or from any
custody under or by virtue of any process issued under the laws of the
United States by any court, judge, or commissioner, or from the custody of
an officer or employee of the United States pursuant to lawful arrest, shall,
if the custody or confinement is by virtue ofan arrest on a charge of felony,
or conviction of any offense, be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both; or if the custody or confinement is for
extradition, or for exclusion or expulsion proceedings under the
immigration laws, or by virtue of an arrest or charge of or for a
misdemeanor, and prior to conviction, be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
123. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 410-11.
124. See id.at409-15 (analyzing the elements of the necessity defense and its applicability
to the defendants).
125. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B) (West 1999).
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medical use."' 26 The addition of these words shows that Congress recognizes

that these drugs may come to have medical value in the future. Congress does
not wish to permanently forbid the drugs' use.
Additionally, the CSA exists to prevent the "substantial and detrimental
effect[s] on the health and general welfare of the American people" that the
"illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, and possession and improper
use of controlled substances have.', 12 7 Since Congress felt it necessary to pass
the CSA in order to protect the "welfare of the American people,""2 8 one can
assume that use of a controlled substance would be tolerated if the drug were
necessary to prolong the health and general welfare of an individual. Congress
appears to acknowledge this possibility by leaving room for Schedule I drugs
to be deemed to have medical value in the future.
Some argue that the necessity defense is precluded because the CSA gave
the Attorney General sole authority to determine a drug's medical value.'29
However, this authority extends only to rescheduling a drug or to removing it
from the schedules entirely. 30 The common law defense of necessity does not
deprive the Attorney General of his statutory authority; it simply allows a drug
to be taken if the user can prove, on a case-by-case basis, that such use is
absolutely necessary to preserve his health and well-being."'
Courts should maintain their equitable discretion in issuing an injunction
32
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 882 so that the necessity defense can be applied.
There is "no evidence that Congress intended to divest.. . [courts of their]
broad equitable discretion to formulate appropriate relief when and if
injunctions are sought."' 33 Employing this equitable discretion, courts can
properly weigh government interests with an individual's interests on a caseby-case analysis.
V. THE

MEDICAL NECESSITY DEFENSE AS

AN EXCEPTION TO THE

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT

A. MarijuanaCases Involving the MedicalNecessity Defense
The medical necessity defense is a specific application of the necessity
defense, and it allows unlawful conduct that is necessary to alleviate a medical

126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. Id. § 801(2).

128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. Brief for the Petitioner at 25, United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 121
S. Ct. 1711 (2001) (No. 00-151).
130. See 21 U.S.C. § 811.
131. See supra Part II.A.
132. See 21 U.S.C. § 882.
133. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 190 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir.
1999).
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condition.1 4 The medical necessity defense has been successfully used in
marijuana cases for patients suffering from glaucoma, multiple sclerosis, AIDS,
and other serious ailments." 5 This defense has been employed when the
defendant suffers from a medical condition that marijuana alleviates in a way
that no legal medicine can. 136
The first case to recognize the medical necessity defense in a marijuana
case was UnitedStates v. Randall.'37 Robert Randall suffered from glaucoma,
a disorder that causes an imbalance of pressure in the eyes and that ultimately
results in blindness.' He had attempted to use legal medicines to alleviate the
pressure, but they became "increasingly ineffective as [his] tolerance [to the
drugs] increased."'3 9 Eventually, the intraocular pressure could not be
controlled, and he lost sight in his right eye; he also began to lose sight in his
left eye.'" He began smoking marijuana and found it alleviated the pressure in
his eyes.' After his arrest for marijuana possession and cultivation, Randall
raised the defense of medical necessity.'42
The District of Columbia Superior Court provided an insightful analysis
of the medical necessity defense in marijuana cases. The court concentrated its
reasoning on the balancing of harms after it found that Randall had satisfied all
the other elements of the necessity defense. 43 The court weighed Randall's
interests against those of the government!" It began by reviewing the
legislative history of marijuana prohibition and emphasized that "[m]edical
evidence suggest[ed] that the prohibition [was] not well founded."' 45 The court
cited reports from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the
predecessor of the Department of Health and Human Services, which "found
the current penalties too harsh in view of the relatively inoffensive character of
the drug, and recommended decriminalization.'1
To weigh the competing interests, the court cited the famous case Roe v.
Wade. 47 In finding state statutes prohibiting abortion unconstitutional, the U.S.
Supreme Court "stressed the fundamental nature of the right of an individual

134. See supra Part II.A.
135. See Kevin B. Zeesej Legal&=ues Relatedto the Medical Use ofMarijuana,in CAnNApis iN
MEDIcAL PRACICF 22 (Mary Lynn Mathre ed., 1997).
136. Id. at23.
137. 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2249 (1976).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Randall, 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at2252;seesupranote 45 and accompanying text.
144. Randall, 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 2252.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Roe v. Wade, 410 .S. 113 1973.
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to preserve and control her body."' 48 Following this reasoning, the court in

Randall held that in a medical marijuana case:
[N]o direct harm will be visited upon innocent third parties;
any major ill effects from the inhalation of marijuana smoke
will occur to the defendant alone. Furthermore, defendant, by
growing marijuana for his own consumption, cannot be said
to be contributing to the illegal trafficking in this drug, and
thus injuring, however nebulously, innocent members of the
public. In any event, it is unlikely that such slight, speculative
and undemonstrable harm could be considered more
important than defendant's right to sight.' 49
To reach its conclusion, the court analyzed whether the District of
Columbia's governing statute precluded the necessity defense.' The D.C.
Code mirrored the current restriction in the CSA.'5 ' Though the statute did not
provide for any defenses other than the obvious defense that one did not
commit the act, courts had interpreted the statute and similar criminal statutes
as implicitly "requiring a particular state of mind.' 1 2 The implication, then, is
that in medical marijuana cases, the medical necessity defense should be
allowed because the defendant often does not possess the requisite criminal
intent.' 3 The defendant should be allowed to defend against the CSA by
arguing necessity to show that the violation was due to a different set of
circumstances than the required criminal intent.
The medical necessity defense was also successful inJenks v. State.' That

case involved a married couple, both of whom were afflicted with AIDS.' 55

Kenneth Jenks, a hemophiliac, contracted AIDS from a blood transfusion. 5 6 He

unknowingly gave it to his wife, who soon began vomiting and suffering from
weight loss.'57 She was prescribed numerous drugs for her nausea, but none of
them worked.' 58 In addition, Kenneth Jenks suffered from nausea and lack of
appetite when he started AZT treatment. 5 9 The Jenks tried marijuana and found

148. Randall, 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 2253. For a further discussion of this issue, see
Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-55.
149. Randall, 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 2253.
150. Id.
151. Id. The statute read: "It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, possess,
have under his control, sell, prescribe, administer, dispense, or compound any narcotic drug,
except as authorized in this chapter." Id. (footnote omitted).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 582 So. 2d 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
155. Id. at 677.
156. Id.
157. Id.

158. Id.
159. Id.
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it helped them stay on their AID)S medications because it relieved their nausea,
stimulated their appetite, and helped them gain weight. 60 The Florida District
Court of Appeals concluded that the Florida statute, which was similar to the
CSA, did not bar the necessity defense because it did not "speak[]
unequivocally" about "abrogating" the common law defense. 6 1 The Court of
Appeals found that the Jenks had sufficiently established medical necessity. 62
The Jenks proved that there was no legal alternative to their course of action by
having a medical expert and physician testify that there existed no drug
could alleviate the couple's symptoms as effectively as
treatment that
63
marijuana.

1

The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Hutchins" came
to the opposite conclusion of Randall and Jenks. That case involved a man
diagnosed with scleroderma, a slowly progressive disease that causes the buildup of scar tissue in the skin and internal organs. 61 The patient also suffered
from a range of ailments related to the disease, such as nausea, loss of appetite,
and pain from swallowing. 6 6 Although no known effective treatment or cure
existed for this possibly fatal disease, the patient found that marijuana
alleviated some of his symptoms. 6 Though the court did not find that the
governing statute precluded the medical necessity defense, it concluded that the
defense168could not be sustained in this case after balancing the competing
harms.

Chief Justice Liacos and Justice Nolan wrote a vigorous dissent, 69 which
quickly led to the passage of a marijuana research law and to the Massachusetts
governor's pardon of the defendant.' The dissenting opinion charged the
majority with "engag[ing] in a speculative judicial fact finding" in its reasoning
about which harm was greater.' The dissenting justices argued that it should
be for the jury to decide whether obeying or breaking the law produced the
greater harm:
While [we] recognize that the public has a strong interest in
the enforcement of drug laws and in the strict regulation of
narcotics, [we] do not believe that the interest would be
significantly harmed by permitting ajury to consider whether

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Jenks, 582 So.2d at 679.
Id.
Id.
Id.
575 N.E.2d 741 (Mass. 1991).
d at 742.

166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 745-47.

170. See Zeese, supra note 135, at 28.
171. Hutchins, 575 N.E.2d at 745 (Liacos, C.J., dissenting).
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the defendant cultivated and used marihuana in order to
alleviate7 agonizing and painful symptoms caused by an
illness. 1
The dissenting opinion also pointed out that the majority ignored the rationale
behind the necessity defense in that sometimes "the value protected by the law"
was overruled by a "superseding value which [made] it inappropriate and
unjust to apply the usual criminal rule."'' The majority had ignored the
superseding value in medical marijuana cases, which was the "humanitarian
and compassionate value
in allowing an individual to seek relief from
t4
agonizing symptoms."'1
B. MedicalMarijuanaJustifiedby the Necessity Defense
It appears that the U.S. Supreme Court has also ignored the "humanitarian
and compassionate value in allowing an individual to seek relief from
agonizing symptoms.'1 7 In Oakland Cannabis, the Court ruled that lower
courts could not consider the medical necessity defense without directly
violating the CSA because "[c]ourts of equity cannot, in their discretion, reject
the balance that Congress has struck in a statute.', 76 However, as explained
above, such a balance should not be read into the CSA.7 7 Therefore, courts
should recognize that the balancing of harms required by the defense could
come out ina defendant's favor.' As Justice Stevens stated in his concurring
opinion in Oakland Cannabis, "whether the defense might be available to a
seriously ill patient for whom there is no alternative means of avoiding
starvation or extraordinary suffering is a difficult issue that is not presented [in
this case].' 79
Allowing the medical necessity defense will not nullify the purpose of the
CSA 80 because the defense is not easily proven. It will not be possible for
everyone to defend the use of marijuana or other Schedule I substances. Before
the defense can even be argued at trial, the defendant must prove to the court,
as a matter of law, that enough evidence exists to support the defense.'' A
defendant must show that he was faced with a choice of evils and that he chose
172. Id.; see also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,419-20 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)
(disagreeing with the Court's decision to rule out the necessity defense for prison escapees
because it was a fact question for a jury to decide whether or not the conditions were so bad as
to leave the escapees with no choice but to flee).
173. Hutchins, 575 N.E.2d at 746 (Liacos, C.J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 746 (Liacos, C.J., dissenting).
175. Id. (Liacos, C.J., dissenting).
176. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 121 S. Ct. 1711, 1721 (2001).
177. See supra Part IV.
178. See Hutchins, 575 N.E.2d at 744.
179. Oakland CannabisBuyers' Coop., 121 S.Ct. at 1723 (Stevens, J., concurring).
180. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
181. State v. Cram, 600 A.2d 733, 734 (Vt. 1991).
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the lesser evil.' In other words, he must convince the court that not using
marijuana would have caused greater harm than using the drug and breaking
the law.8 3 He must also prove that he acted to prevent imminent harm and that
he reasonably believed that marijuana use would avoid the potential harm.'"4
A recreational drug user would have difficulty using the defense because he
would have to show that his use began with the intent of alleviating a severe,
imminent bodily condition. Finally, a defendant would be forced to prove that
he tried legal drugs but that none of them were as effective as marijuana.'
However, some patients can successfully use the medical necessity
defense. To correctly assert the defense, a patient would first have to prove that
he used the marijuana with the intention of improving a medical ailment.1 6 He
would have to show that his action was in response to imminent harm and that
he reasonably believed that the marijuana would alleviate the medical condition
or the painful symptoms associated with the ailment.8 7 Second, he would have
to demonstrate that there was no legal alternative to marijuana for effective
treatment of his medical condition."8 One way ofproving this element would
be to show that the patient had tried other legal alternatives but had found them
ineffective. 9 Finally, the defendant would need to prove that he was faced
with two evils and that he chose the lesser evil.'90 This balancing of harms
would require him to convince the court that the harm to society in letting him
use marijuana was less than the human suffering sought to be avoided.' 9' Using
these requirements, individuals should be allowed to prove that the necessity
defense applies to them. The U.S. Supreme Court was mistaken to deny them
this opportunity.

Many of the Cooperative's patients should be able to invoke the defense.
They face a choice ofevils because they are required to violate the law in order
to prevent severe pain, nausea, loss of appetite or sight, and other serious
ailments. 92 When the suffering is great enough, the benefits of marijuana use
should outweigh the possible dangers to society. The patients also face
imminent harm, such as excruciating pain, severe spasms, blindness, and even
death, if they are not allowed access to marijuana.' 93 It seems likely that their
sole intention in using marijuana is to alleviate this harm.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
1999).
190.
191.
192.
00-151).
193.

Id. at 735.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
See supranote 45 and accompanying text.
See supranote 45 and accompanying text.
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 190 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir.
See supranote 45 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 147-49 and accompanying text.
Respondent's Brief at 5, Oakland CannabisBuyers' Coop., 121 S. Ct. at 1711 (No.
Id.
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There is often no legal alternative to using marijuana because the legal
drugs are not effective. 19 4A legal form of the THC chemical in marijuana exists
in a pill called Marinol.'95 However, this pill is not an effective treatment for all
patients:
Marinol is taken orally, in pill form. Patients suffering from
severe nausea and retching cannot tolerate the pills and thus
do not benefit from the drug. There are likely other reasons
why smoked marijuana is sometimes more effective tha[n]
Marinol. The body's absorption of96the chemical may be faster
or more complete when inhaled.
The necessity defense requires that there be a reasonable legal alternative
before it is precluded. 197 Marinol is not a reasonable alternative for some people
because they cannot swallow the pill or keep it in their system long enough to
digest it so as to enjoy its benefits. 98 Petitioning the government to reschedule
marijuana as a Schedule II drug is also not a reasonable alternative. Such a
petition has already been attempted, and it took almost two decades to
resolve. 9 9 If such an alternative were feasible, then patients would be required
to obey the CSA, but "it hardly seems reasonable to require an AIDS,
glaucoma, or cancer patient to wait twenty years [or more] if the patient
requires marijuana to alleviate a current medical problem.""0 0 By the time
another petition for rescheduling is decided, the patients will likely have died.
VI. CONCLUSION

The fight for the medicinal use of marijuana has not ended with the U.S.
Supreme Court's recent decision. Despite the ruling, eight states-Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington-have
medical marijuana laws similar to California's and show no signs of repealing
the laws.20 ' In fact, one month after the Court's ruling, Nevada's governor
signed a bill "allowing 'seriously ill' patients to use marijuana for medical

194. See Jenks v. State, 582 So. 2d 676, 677 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
195. Respondent's Brief at 6, Oakland CannabisBuyers' Coop., 121 S. Ct. at 1711 (No.
00-151).
196.
197.
198.
00-151).
199.
200.

Id. at 7.
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980).
Respondent's Brief at 7, Oakland CannabisBuyers' Coop., 121 S. Ct. at 1711 (No.
See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1102 (N.D. Cal.

1998).
201. StatelinesMedical Marijuana:Supreme Court Ruling Has Little Effect, AMERICAN
HEALTH LINE (June 14, 2001), available at http://www.americanhealthline.com.
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purposes."2 2 To date, there has been no federal movement to prohibit the laws
in these states. 2 3 Furthermore, according to an operator of one of San
Francisco's cannabis clubs, "business has thrived" since the ruling. 2°4
There are individuals who endure tremendous suffering, whether due to
glaucoma, AIDS, cancer, or some other severe illness, and thus can alleviate
the symptoms by using marijuana. When an individual is faced with deciding
between severe bodily harm and compliance with the law, the law should allow
the person to relieve his suffering. The necessity defense is not precluded by
the Controlled Substances Act and is an equitable and just legal remedy for
people facing these decisions.
Emily Farr

202. StatelinesNevada: GovernorSignsMedicalMarijuanaBill,AMERICANHEALTHLIN
(June 15, 2001), availableat http://vww.americanhealthline.com.
203. Statelines MedicalMarijuana:Supreme Court Ruling Has Little Effect, supra note
201.
204. Id.
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